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W e  offer a new typology of problems according to such a t t r ibutes  as  the fuzzy set of possible 
solutions, the fuzzy set of properties a solution should have, the fuzzy set of knowledge necessary 
and sufficient to find a solution, deadlines and constraints. Problems are ranked by degree of 
' s t ructuredness '  f rom well-s tructured to ill-defined. Some real problems are shown to be ill-defined 
and the causes of their inherent imprecision are t raced.  A model for coping with ill-defined problems 
enables us to estimate an optimal degree of precision in both deal ing with the problem and in 
request ing information to help cope with it. This  has interesting implications for the design of 
information systems.  
INTRODUCTION 
WHEN SIMON [15] completed his study of ad- 
ministrative behavior, he had shifted the 
emphasis from the art of 'getting things done' 
that is, from the study of action, to the study of 
decision-making or the determination of what 
is to be done. The 8-yr period of Simon's study 
was also one of exceptional creativity in the 
development of a mathematical foundation for 
decision theory [18, 19]. A decision problem 
was regarded to be specified by (1) a set of 
alternative acts, (2) a set of possible states that 
the decision-maker's world could be in after an 
action is to be taken and (3) the net benefit that 
the decision-maker can expect from each state- 
action contingency. 
We call 'problem solving' the activity of 
making a rational choice among the options 
when that requires us to use expert knowledge 
and lengthy chains of deductions or inductive 
inferences. Playing chess differs from gambling 
in a lottery in that we need to think and know 
more in deciding on a move than we do in 
placing a bet. It is therefore more typical of 
problem-solving than, for example, poker. 
'Rational' does not necessarily refer to adher- 
ence of criteria for optimization or maximiza- 
tion of expected utility but to the behavior of 
people in risky choice situations according to 
laws and psychologically significant criteria 
11 
that we are only now beginning to discover 
[17]. 
Amarel [1, 2] has conceptualized a 'problem' 
as being a statement that specifies three sets: 
(1) The set of all possible solutions, illustrated 
by the italicized phrase in "Find all 
integer pairs (x,y) such that 3x + 17y = 51 
using Euclid's algorithm." 
(2) The set of properties a solution should 
have, illustrated by the phrase 
"3x + 17y = 51" in the above problem- 
statement. 
(3) The set of statements representing what is 
known that is necessary and sufficient to 
find a solution, illustrated by the phrase 
"using Euclid's algorithm" in the above 
problem-statement. 
Computers have been tools for vastly ampli- 
fying our ability to solve problems that are 
reducible to arithmetic. But they are now also 
recognized as tools for transforming our very 
conception of problems and problem-solving. 
That has a far greater impact. Recent models of 
human information processing have led to new 
approaches to the study of human problem- 
solving [5-7,10,12]. Higher-level program- 
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ming languages have enabled a computer user 
merely to express his problem--not necessarily 
a mathematical one--in that l:*hguage 
with the expectation that the computer 
system (compiler, etc.) will work out the 
detailed steps of a solution procedure as well as 
their execution. 
It seems that most of our education, from 
kindergarten to graduate school, trains us for 
problem-solving in this sense. Yet, it is ironic 
that most of us seldom encounter situations 
outside schools, laboratories or computer sys- 
tems that necessitate the making of decisions 
that we recognize as resembling the so-called 
'problems' to which we refer in the above sense. 
Our most important choice tasks, such as 
choosing a job or a career are not 'problems' in 
this sense. Those who are highly skilled in such 
problem-solving (even with the aid of sophisti- 
cated computers) are often not the best 
equipped to do well in real choice situations. 
According to a more realistic model of prob- 
lem solving [I 1], this process involves: (1) con- 
ceptualization; (2) modeling; (3) model-solving; 
(4) implementation, as systemically integrated 
subprocesses. The corresponding attempt to 
analyie this model, however, still assumes the 
existence of a well-defined time-varying goal 
G(t) and a performance function a(t) such that 
discrepancies between the two can be specified 
and lessened. It is doubtful that the mathemati- 
cal representation used in such models, e.g. 
conceptualizing G and a, so that G - a  (subtrac- 
tion) is meaningful, captures the essence of 
'problem-solving' in real life. We propose in 
this paper to reexamine our conceptualization 
of what a 'problem' is with specific emphasis 
given to the 'ill-structured' problem. Specifi- 
cally, we replace the notion of a 'problem' by 
that of a 'task-situation'. We propose to replace 
'problem-solving' by the term 'coping'. We 
argue that we are likely to cope well with 
simple task-situations when our representation 
of these situations is as precise as possible. 
However, if a task-situation is complex, we fail 
to cope if we represent the situation not only 
too vaguely but similarly if we view it with 
excessive precision. We find, in fact, that there 
is an optimal degree of precision with which to 
view complex task-situations. 
The new idea we propose here is to charac- 
terize a problem not only by (1) the set of all 
possible solutions, (2) the set of properties a 
solution should have and (3) the knowledge 
necessary and sufficient to find a solution, but 
on the basis of criteria based on constraints of 
(4) time, (5) information processing and (6) 
emotional and social factors as well. The im- 
portance of time constraints or deadlines is of 
course well known to every manager, whether 
he manages only himself or others. A 'solution' 
after the deadline is no solution. Even in 
schools and psychological laboratories there 
are implicit time constraints, though neither 
teachers/experimenters nor students/subjects 
always regard these explicitly as part of the 
task-situation. Information-processing con- 
straints are another important part of a task- 
situation that should be explicitly recognized. 
(Simon was among the first to stress this). A 
shopper in a supermarket may be aware that 
he/she could buy a 'better' basket of commodi- 
ties (e.g. meeting nutritional requirements, least 
cost) with the help of a linear program than by 
browsing and responding to advertisers' cues 
etc., but unless he or she had a programmed 
calculator to do this (with all necessary coeffi- 
cients-e.g,  the number of grams of protein/gin 
for each item of interest in the supermarket), 
the necessary information processing capacity 
is lacking. 
The social and emotional constraints in the 
task-situation have, to our knowledge, not yet 
been identified. Possibly they may have the 
greatest importance among the six attributes of 
a task-situation. Even if the supermarket shop- 
per had the required information processing 
capacity, he or she may be unwilling to be seen 
by acquaintances as someone who computes 
what to buy, The computation could be made 
at home, with a catalog as input to the home 
computer and a shopping list or order as out- 
put, and the order could even be automatically 
placed, filled and processed. But the shopper 
might miss browsing in the supermarket not 
only among the goods but amongst the other 
shoppers as well. 
There is a second new idea of great import- 
ance that we now introduce. That is the pre- 
cision of these six sets of attributes of a task- 
situation. The set of possible choices between a 
and b is less precise than the set of choices 
among values of a probability with which to 
make one of the two choices. It is less precise 
because it does not specify whether the choice 
between a or b is to be made by tossing a coin, 
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casting a die, according to a pattern, rule, etc. 
Minimizing the expected loss is a more precise 
statement of a property desired in a solution 
than 'winning as often as possible'. 
SIMPLE TASK SITUATIONS 
It is plausible that for such tasks as an odds- 
even game, (a simple task situation in which 
each of two players can simultaneously put 
forth one or two fingers with one player win- 
ning if the combined number of fingers is even) 
the greater the precision in specifying (1) the set 
of possible solutions, (2) the desired properties 
of a solution and, (3) the knowledge needed to 
find a solution, the greater the chances of find- 
ing a satisfactory solution. This is not evident 
for the attributes 4-6 mentioned in the pre- 
vious section. Specifying with great precision a 
deadline by which a choice in the game must 
be made may be less productive than leaving 
some latitude for loose interpretation; total 
vagueness is counter-productive as well 
because it confuses. 
Similarly, too precise a specification of infor- 
mation processing requirements could incur 
the risk of overestimation resulting in unused 
capacity or inefficient use of costly resources or 
of underestimation, leading to ineffectiveness 
or other inefficiencies. Too little precision in 
specifying needed information processing capa- 
city gives no guidance with respect to the 
means by which the needed resources may be 
procured. There may be an optimal degree of 
precision providing the decision-maker with 
the flexibility to adapt to the needs as he learns 
them. Finally, very precisely specified criteria 
for affect or social interaction engender exces- 
sive rigidity that makes behavior appear auto- 
matic and inhuman, while totally unspecified 
criteria lead to permissiveness and uncon- 
trolled behavior. Both extremes are generally 
counterproductive. 
As an example of a counterproductive way 
of representing a simple-task situation, let us 
take the case of two individuals engaged in a 
game in which each can simultaneously put 
forth one or two fingers. One player receives a 
penny from the other if the combined number 
of fingers is odd and vice-versa if it is even. 
This can be accurately represented as a zero- 
sum game with payoff matrix 
1 finger 2 fingers 
2 fingers -1 
f ° r ° n e ° f t h e p l a y e r s a n d (  -11 - I )  for his 
opponent. 
A poor representation of this situation is one. 
in which a person believes that, at each move: 
(The parentheses denote a set) 
(1) his options for action are: ('one finger', 'two 
fingers'); 
(2) the basis for his choice should be to: (win 
as often as possible, beat the opponent); 
(3) what he needs to know to decide is: (a pat- 
tern in the opponent's choices, a telepathic 
signal); 
(4) his time constraints are: (to decide in less 
than a second or so); 
(5) his information processing requirements 
are: (to consider only elementary patterns, 
to guess without thinking); 
(6) his psycho-social criteria are: (to appear as 
a regular person rather than one who calcu- 
lates his moves, to conceal his decision by 
maintaining a pokerface). 
Most people who play this do not know of or 
think of the idea of a mixed strategy in a zero- 
sum game. Yet, it can be experimentally veri- 
fied that they select one finger at random ap- 
proximately half the time, just as game theory 
predicts. It is a very simple task to perform, 
partly because it does not depend greatly on 
the quality of how a player represents the task 
to himself. 
While, for attributes (1)-(3) of a simple task- 
fituation, coping appears to be enhanced by 
the maximum precision that the decision- 
maker is capable of, there may be an optimum 
degree somewhere between the lowest and 
highest degree of precision in specifying attri- 
butes (4)-(6). The simpler the task-situations, 
the closer that optimum degree is to the maxi- 
mum. 
TOWARD GREATER COMPLEXITY 
What makes a task-situation more complex? 
We extend the definition of complexity used in 
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computer science so that not  only task-situa- 
tions with greater information-processing re- 
quirements but also those which cannot be 
readily (or at all) represented as well-defined 
problem-statements are regarded as more 
complex. As an example of a task-situation of 
intermediate complexity, consider a person in a 
moderately satisfying job who is offered a new 
job with much better pay. One representation 
of six attributes of this problem-situation is: 
(1) Options = (Keep present job, accept new 
job). 
(2) Desiderata of choice = (Maximize income, 
optimize self-actualization). 
(3) Needed knowledge = (Detailed data 
regarding new job, awareness of priority 
feelings). 
(4) Time criterion = (Decision in two weeks, 
decision in two months). 
(5) Information Processing Criteria = (Analy- 
tic reasoning, 'Clinical' judgment). 
(6) Psychic Criteria = (Be and appear decisive, 
rigidity). 
In terms of the self-actualization criteria, the 
decision-maker could represent attributes (1) 
and (2) in the form of a payoff matrix, as 
follows: 
Keep Take 
present job new job 
Feeling of tiigh self- Net benefit Net benefit 
actualization, incl. pay High Very high 
Feeling of low or med. Net benefit Net benefit 
self-actualization, incl. pay Very low low 
He is uncertain about his future state of well- 
being, especially if he takes the new job. There 
are at least two kinds of uncertainty. One is 
illustrated with the example of a person's inabi- 
lity to predict whether a tossed coin will land 
heads or tails; another, by whether a tossed 
coin is 'true' or 'false'. The categorization of 
coins into 'true' vs 'false' is a particular repre- 
sentation. It reflects a particular state of 
(imperfect) understanding (as opposed to 
confusion), much as does a classification of job- 
satisfaction criteria into income and self-actua- 
lization criteria. The further classification of 
self-actualization into high and low degrees 
illustrates yet another degree of constrained 
freedom in the hierarchical representation of a 
task-situation. The decision-maker is free to 
categorize self-actualization in many ways but 
the choices are subject to a constraint in so far 
as they all must pertain to self-actualization. 
Kahneman and Tversky[17] showed that 
preference among two hypothetical job offers 
depends on the subject's present position. If he 
is earning $17,000 with a 30~o chance of pro- 
motion within three years, he is 1½ times as 
likely to Prefer a change to ($18,000 annual 
salary, 60~o chance of promotion in 3 years 
over a change to ($16,500, 90~o). I f ,  on the 
other hand, his present position is ($15,000, 
75~o), then he is 8 times as likely to prefer a 
change to ($16,500, 75~) over a change to 
($18,000, 60%). 
Different decision-makers differ with respect 
to how they understand, imagine, conceptualize, 
a task-situation. This is reflected in their repre- 
sentation. That preferences vary with a de- 
cision-maker's frame of reference is well known 
[17]. Different laws appear to govern the be- 
havior of people in dealing with uncertain and 
imprecise situations than the laws of rational 
behavior according to probabilistic decision 
theory--e.g, maximizing expected value. 
Clearly, a precise representation of all 
aspects of a completely random system is im- 
possible. But while certain macroscopic attri- 
butes can be described with precision, all 
microscopic details cannot. This imposes an im- 
plicit limitation on the facility with which an 
individual can cope with a complex (i.e. uncer- 
tain or random) task-situation. 
It would appear that randomness is not the 
only aspect of a task-situation that makes it 
complex. The cardinality and fullness of the 
sets used in specifying the six attributes also 
contribute importantly to complexity. The set 
of possible solutions for a complex situation 
involves more variables and a larger range for 
each variable than is the case for a simpler 
situation. For example, the number of first- 
order variables considered in the design of cars 
in the 1970's was greater than the number in 
the 1950s when pollution, for instance, was 
only a second-order effect in light of fewer 
existing cars. 
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The set of properties a solution should 
satisfy is larger for a more complex situation. 
Some of the desiderata that are added as com- 
plexity increases originate from greater interre- 
lations among variables. For  example, relations 
among variables in designing cars in the 1970s 
still need take but little account of the trends in 
communication. As both transportation and 
communication technologies develop, the 
demand patterns for each may begin to inter- 
act. The interactions add additional properties 
and constraints that desired 'solutions' should 
satisfy. 
The amount  of relevant knowledge useful in 
finding a solution is much greater--as well as 
more difficult to specify, find, understand and 
use--as the task-situation increases in complex- 
ity. Stakes are higher and more irreversible. 
Complex task-situations demand more of a 
break with traditional ways of thinking than 
do simple ones. A task that is but a minor 
variant of one we encounter frequently is not 
complex. A task that is quite unlike any we 
have ever encountered is complex because we 
must think quite differently about it. More 
massive shifts in representation, in our concep- 
tualization, are required. Relevant knowledge 
is far more difficult to identify and recognize. 
Time constraints are more demanding for 
complex tasks, and information processing re- 
quirements are greater. In this respect, a com- 
putationally complex task-situation is also 
complex in our sense. More and more subtle 
social and psychological criteria also increase 
complexity. 
REPRESENTATIONS OF  COMPLEX 
TASK-SITUATIONS 
Among the most complex task-situations are 
those involving human systems, particularly 
those in which many diverse people interact in 
ways that give rise to new forms of social organ- 
ization, and to new self-generating behavior 
patterns. We can imagine, for example, a small 
group of people in a community having to 
decide on a new mayor or chief of some ser- 
vice. Suppose that they agree to meet in order 
to select the candidates, in essence, the set of 
possible 'solutions'. Each participant may bring 
with him a different agenda. The first task is to 
reach some agreement about the agenda, about 
a consensual way of viewing the common task- 
situation. If each participant starts with a 
slightly different understanding, then a com- 
mon image of the situation may emerge as the 
members learn--i.e, revise and adjust their im- 
ages by mutal interaction. 
The task-situation includes the participants. 
If they start with very diverse images or points 
of view, then the situation is more complex, 
and it may take far longer for them to reach a 
common understanding if they reach one at all. 
If one participant's outlook is primarily politi- 
cal, with a cognitive style characterized by con- 
creteness and action-orientation (rather than 
reflectiveness) while another is primarily ration- 
al, abstract and reflective, a meeting of minds 
may be hard to reach. 
Agreement on what properties a solution 
should have is harder to reach if the partici- 
pants have different value systems. Only after 
they have converged on at least an approxima- 
tion of a common image of the task-situation 
can they proceed to resolve their value con- 
flicts. This is obviously more difficult when 
values are far apart, and thus task-situations 
which involve such diverse participants tend to 
be more complex. The most acrimonious con- 
troversies can arise over the qualifications of 
the ideal candidate for the post. Often political, 
rational and normative aspects are confused 
and interchanged in the debate, with a partici- 
pant arguing for the importance of some trait 
that his favorite candidate happens to have. 
The reasons, however, why he may favor that 
candidate may focus primarily on political self 
interest (who controls what). 
After many participants have managed to 
share some perception of the task situation by 
agreeing on the options and even on the desi- 
derata of an ideal option, it might be assumed 
that the knowledge needed to choose the candi- 
"date could be easily identified, found and used, 
because there is a greater chance for at least 
one of the participants to have the required 
expertise or experience. However, if the diver- 
sity of expertise is fragmented and uncoordin- 
ated, the ensuing search can just as easily turn 
into a cacaphonous Babel. People who come 
from vastly different intellectual worlds do not 
speak the same language. The cycle of attempt- 
ing to share conceptualizations, points of view, 
images and knowledge, followed by attempts to 
resolve value conflict merely starts over, but at 
a different level. 
o m e  8 I B 
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Different participants in a situation also 
have diverse perspectives about time. Some 
understand the art of strategically timing key 
decisions, while others are oblivious to the 
passage and value of time. A task-situation in 
which the timing of group decisions to be made 
is ambiguous or uncertain, possibly due to 
widely differing views about when the decision 
is due, is complex if only because the partici- 
pants may expand their energies and budget 
their time in totally incompatible ways, leading 
to interference, divergence, confusion and frag- 
mentation. One of the key tasks of a coordina- 
tor is to synchronize the time schedules of 
various participants. 
Does the information processin 0 capacity of a 
group of information processors exceed that 
of the individuals in a super-additive way? A 
conjecture from studies on the logic of induc- 
tion suggests that it can. An expanding, inter- 
acting community of interactive trial and error 
machines will eventually identify any partial 
recursive function, with each member of the 
community receiving a non-terminating 
sequence of ordered pairs that constitute the 
function [14]. Thus, an ever-growing com- 
munity of machines, each of which can even- 
tually identify the relations of the form "There 
exists xl such that R2(xl,x) '' for all two-place 
relations R 2 can eventually identify relations of 
the form "There exists xl and for all x2 such 
that R3(xI,x2,x) '' for all three-place predicates 
R3(Y.2 of the Kleene Arithmetic Hierarchy). In 
this sense, an expanding community can gener- 
ate (as well as cope with) more complex situ- 
ations than a single member. 
Finally, the affective and social aspects of a 
situation often become very pronounced only 
when there are many participants in a situ- 
ation. If diversity of cognitive styles contributes 
to situational complexity, then the diversity of 
emotional response patterns and social interac- 
tion styles complicates it further. A major 
source of this complexity is a lack of awareness 
not only regarding how others feel and how 
they are affected by our behavior, but by our 
own feelings and likely reactions directed at the 
behavior of  others. Another source of complex- 
ity are the social traps [13] or 'catch-22' situ- 
ations that are often generated by certain 
people, especially when they gravitate toward 
others like themselves in an effort to create self- 
perpetuating 'catch-22' situations. A person 
may, for example, nominate one of his peers to 
an open post only then to present all the 
reasons why he would not be a good choice, or 
get the candidate elected and then do every- 
thing he can to keep him from controlling the 
situation. Situations characterized by social 
complexity present participants with difficult 
trade-offs between seemingly conflicting 
options, options of which they are frequently 
unaware or by which they feel entrapped. It is 
this latter feeling that contributes to the funda- 
mental complexity of task-situations. 
COPING BY MODIFYING 
REPRESENTATIONS 
Living systems, and human systems, in par- 
ticular, have a remarkable ability to survive, to 
'muddle through' task-situations which our 
most cleverly designed and most 'intelligent' 
non-living systems would very probably not 
survive. If the rule 'that anything that could go 
wrong will go wrong' applies to the complex 
systems we build, then a rule such as 'anythiny 
that could 9o ri(¢ht will 90 right' may apply to 
the human systems that have naturally evolved. 
Deliberate efforts to destroy a species or a 
defunct human institution have often proved to 
be quite unsuccessful, as these systems, like 
new strains of bacteria or weeds, develop 
unforseeable forms of resistance and resilience 
faster than they can be overcome. The concept 
of coping applies to adaptive survival in 
human systems that we value; it also applies to 
bacteria that we value negatively (e.g. mutants 
of viruses in hospitals that adapted to resist 
antibiotics). We confine our attention here to 
its use in human systems in which how the 
participants represent their task-situation is the 
primary aspect of coping. 
PRECISION AND ITS EFFECT ON 
THE REPRESENTATION 
We focus even more sharply on one aspect of 
a representation: its precision. We now try to 
show that for a complex task-situation, an 
ideal representation has an intermediate rather 
than an extreme degree of precision. As an 
example, we analyze the task-situation in 
which one member of a department is to be 
chosen as its chairman and persuaded to 
accept. Snow [16] has provided a masterful de- 
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scription (fictional) of how.a  college in Cam- 
bridge coped with such a situation. 
Suppose that only two ways of imagining the 
situation exist among the group members: (1) 
only people who do not threaten the vital 
interest of key people in the group are accept- 
able; (2) anyone with a sufficiently strong per- 
sonality and capable of leadership is accept- 
able. Adherents of neither view are or care to 
be too precise in specifying 'vital interests', 
"strength of personality', etc. Yet each suffi- 
ciently understands the others' interpretation 
of these terms so that he feels concerned and 
objects. One participant who feels he ought to 
be chairman may try to persuade others that 
he should be a candidate, and he may in the 
process make different, and even contradictory 
statements to different potential constituents. 
The truth of these statements may be second- 
ary to their effectiveness in persuading listeners 
to vote for him. Astute listeners are aware of 
this, and also of the possibility that the rare 
candidate who speaks only the truth may not 
be very promising. How can they cope with the 
first task, of setting up a set of possible solu- 
tions, i.e. of candidates? If they imagine some 
ideal candidate in too much detail and too 
exactly, no one will fit; nor will they agree. If 
they imagine him too vaguely, they have made 
no progress. Successful professional image- 
builders often select just the right degree of 
precision. 
Coping with value conflicts can also be 
helped by the deliberate attempt to avoid both 
excess precision and excess vagueness. Time- 
honored statutes a n d m o r a l  maxims reflect 
these compromises in their language. 'Thou 
shall not kill' owes its force partly to its lack of 
specificity. The potency would be diminished if 
qualified by numerous clauses such as 'except 
in the case of war,' or 'any normal human 
being after conception,' etc. In the case of 
selecting a leader, some may give highest prior- 
ity to those qualifications that will best help 
the group he leads to survive and grow; others 
may stress primarily his ability to accomplish 
aims that he values more highly than the 
group's survival. 
In Fig. 1 we sketch an algorithm that identi- 
fies an optimal degree of precision in specifying 
needed knowledge. Let us take for example the 
group that feels as if it needs to know each 
candidate's managerial skill to remove some of 
the uncertainties. They enter their concern into 
an 'information system.' A good information 
system would not force its users to rephrase 
their concern with greater precision just so that 
it can be provided with information at the level 
of specificity it stores by asking as output such 
questions as, 'will you accept performance 
score on test X as an indicator of managerial  
skill?' It should inform the user that it cannot 
help him unless he specifies his concern with 
greater precision; it should help him to do this 
as well. Similarly, it should have some useful 
response at each level of specificity. If the user 
is too specific, he may not find any useful infor- 
mation at all; if he is too vague, he may get 
some useful information which lays buried in a 
vast array of items that are not  useful, thus 
leaving him little better off than before consult- 
ing the information system. By adjusting a 
level-of-specificity knob in both directions, he 
may eventually reach a level where his request 
for knowledge is represented by 'which reliable 
sources can give first hand accounts of this 
candidate's managerial skills'. Most employers 
do this right away and we argue that this con- 
tributes to the success of human systems 
beyond that which we have right or reason to 
expect. 
Figure 2 provides an overview of our six 
attributes applied to task-situations of simple, 
moderate and high complexity. In each cell of 
the table we show a curve indicating how the 
probability of success in coping varies with the 
degree of precision in the representation of that 
aspect of the situation. These curves should be 
interpreted as hypotheses to be tested experi- 
mentally and derived from our model. It is 
clear from Fig. 2 that in more complex task- 
situations more of our six attributes are char- 
acterized by an optimal degree of precision 
that falls between the extremes of 'most precise' 
and 'completely vague'. Here 'optimal' refers to 
maximization of the probability of coping. 
As we face increasingly complex situations, 
our chances of coping are enhanced when we 
view these situations neither too vaguely nor 
too precisely, but at some appropriate level in 
between. 
C O N C L U S I O N  
The precision with which we view a task- 
situation is an importanl determinant of how 
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FIG. 1. Illustrating convergence to an optimal degree of precision in specifying knowledge needed to 
cope with a task situation. 
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FIG. 2. Attributes of task-situations and their representations, l 
well we cope  wi th  it. T h i s  a s se r t ion  is b a s ed  o n  
a n e w  qua l i t a t i ve  m o d e l  s t i m u l a t e d  by  several  
examples .  I t  has  yet to be tested by  emp i r i c a l  
me thods .  I t  c o r r e s p o n d s  to Mi t ro lTs  stress o n  
the  i m p o r t a n c e  of ' g loba l  views of a p r o b l e m , '  
b u t  differs f rom the la t ter  in s t ress ing the  im-  
p o r t a n c e  of the exac t i tude  wi th  which  such 
views are  held. I t  is c o n s o n a n t  wi th  the  f ind ings  
of  T v e r s k y  a n d  K a h n e m a n  r e g a r d i n g  the  im-  
p o r t a n c e  of f rames  of reference.  I t  is p r e m a t u r e  
to c l a im tha t  the  exact  m a t h e m a t i c a l  m a c h i n -  
ery  of  F u z z y  Set T h e o r y  is a p p r o p r i a t e  or  
necessa ry  for the  fur ther  d e v e l o p m e n t  of o u r  
mode l .  
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